Frege on Truths, Truth and the True by Künne, Wolfgang
Frege on Truths, Truth and the True
Wolfgang Künne
Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg
e founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years
old when he published his paper Der Gedanke (e ought) in 1918. is essay
contains some of Gottlob Frege’s deepest and most provocative reections on the
concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. e plan for my
lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? ‘oughts’, is Frege’s
answer. In §1, I shall explain anddefend this answer. In §2, I shall briey consider his
enthymematic argument for the conclusion that theword ‘true’ resists any attempt at
dening it. In §3, I shall discuss his thesis that the thought that things are thus and so
is identical with the thought that it is true that things are thus and so.e reasonswe
are oered for this thesis will be found wanting. In §4, I shall comment extensively
on Frege’s claim that, in a non-formal language like the one I am currently trying
to speak, we can say whatever we want to say without ever using the word ‘true’
or any of its synonyms. I will reject the propositional-redundancy claim, endorse
the assertive-redundancy claim and deny the connection Frege ascribes to them. In
his classic 1892 paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung (On Sense and Signication) Frege
argues that truth-values are objects. In §5, I shall scrutinize his argument. In §6, I
will show that in Frege’s ideography (Begrisschri) truth, far frombeing redundant,
is omnipresent. e nal §7 is again on truth-bearers, this time as a topic in the
theory of intentionality and inmetaphysics. In the course of discussing Frege’s views
on the objecthood, the objectivity of thoughts and the timelessness of truth(s), I will
plead for a somewhat mitigated Platonism.
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6 Frege on Truths, Truth and the True
1. Truth-Bearers
What is susceptible of truth and falsity? SupposeAnn tells us, ‘Last summer I
spent my holidays in Estonia’. We talk ordinarily and readily enough of, e.g.,
What Ann said; of its being believed or doubted by Ben; of Cindy denying
it; of Douglas saying the same thing, though in dierent words; of its being
moremelodiously expressed in Italian by Emanuela; and of its being true (or
false). On the face of it, the noun-phrases and attendant pronouns here do
not refer to the token words, the token sentence, which Ann uttered; or, in-
deed, to the type-sentence of which she uttered a token; or even to themean-
ing of that sentence, since the same type-sentence, with constant meaning,
can be used to say dierent things with dierent truth-values. Frege calls
the one thing that can be believed and stated and that may be true or false
a thought. (Many other philosophers, including the author of CT, use the
word ‘proposition’ with the same intent.)
But does not Frege identify the thought expressed by an utterance with
the meaning of the sentence uttered? No, he does not. But let us postpone
this issue for a moment and consider a dierent question that is too seldom
asked in the literature on Frege: What does he take sentences to be? He
writes:
(F.1) What is it that we call a sentence [Satz]? A series of sounds [eine
Folge von Lauten], but only if it has a sense [Sinn] (this is notmeant
to convey that any series of sounds that has a sense is a sentence).
[. . . ] (Ged, 60)
So, by Frege’s lights, a sentence is not a type-sentence, something that can be
both uttered and inscribed again and again. It is not an abstract linguistic en-
tity like the one I am talking about when I say, ‘is morning I have read this
sentence in three dierent newspapers, and by now I have heard it at least
four times on the radio.’ Rather, sentences are sentence-tokens, they are con-
crete rather than abstract, particulars rather than universals. Furthermore,
Frege assigns priority to audible tokens as opposed to visible tokens, inscrip-
tions. Basically, he maintains, an inscription is “a direction for forming a
spoken sentence in a language in which series of sounds serve as signs for
expressing a sense” (N, 280 (260)).1 In this respect Frege follows Aristotle’s
footsteps, perhaps unwittingly (De Int. 1): Inscriptions (τα γραϕoµєνα) are
symbols for utterances (τα єν τη ϕωνη). Frege continues:
(F.2) And when we call a sentence true we really mean that its sense is
true [Und wenn wir einen Satz wahr nennen, meinen wir eigentlich
1 e bracketed reference is to the English translation of N.
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seinen Sinn.] Hence it is only the sense of a sentence for which the
question of truth can arise at all. (loc.cit.)
In his 1918 paper Frege does not argue for his contention that we mean the
sense of a sentence S when we call S true. But in a precursor of this paper he
did:
(F.3) For, on the one hand, [1] the truth of a sentence is preserved when
it is correctly translated into another language, and, on the other
hand, [2] it is at least conceivable that the same series of sounds
should have a true sense in one language and a false sense in an-
other. (N, 141 (129))
As far as the rst argument goes, it is equally plausible in the intra-lingual
case as it is in the inter-lingual case. Whether we move from English, ‘A
viola is larger than a violin’, to German, ‘Eine Viola ist größer als eine Violine’,
or whether we move from the latter sentence to a synonymous sentence in
German, ‘Eine Bratsche ist größer als eine Geige’, “truth is preserved”. But one
might object that this does not yet show that these three utterances express
one and the same truth.—Frege’s second argument, too, is equally plausible
in the intra-lingual case as it is in the inter-lingual case.e series of sounds
‘One billion is one thousand million’ expresses a truth in American English
and a falsehood in real English, so what Frege declares to be conceivable
is actually the case, and of course, an utterance of an ambiguous English
sentence (‘Some people have never seen a bank’) may express a truth under
one reading and a falsehood under another reading. But one might object
that this only shows that the outcome of the truth-evaluation of an utterance
depends on the sense assigned to it, but it does not yet show that what is
true or false is not the utterance but rather its sense. Why not say that the
utterance, as its speaker wants it to be understood, is true or false, as the case
may be?
Well, rst of all, this will not work in all cases.e scene is set inMilano,
in pre-Euro times. Annabella, a business woman, has two telephones on her
desk. One day an American colleague and a British friend rang her simulta-
neously wanting to know how much prot her rm has made last year. She
wanted only her friend to know the truth. So picking up both receivers she
said, ‘One billion lira. But excuse me, I have a visitor in my oce. Let us
talk tomorrow.’ And then she hung up. Annabella intended her American
colleague to understand that the prot amounted to 109 lira, and her British
friend to understand that the prot amounted to 1012 lira. A falsehood and
a truth were meant to be conveyed by just one utterance. But why not say
that the utterance, as Annabella wanted it to be understood by her British
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addressee, is true, and that her utterance, as she wanted it to be understood
by her American addressee, is false?
Note how the objector is piling relativizations. If the series of sounds, the
vehicle of the message, were a truth-value bearer it would be both true and
not true, which is certainly unbearable. So we are bound to take a deeper
breath and say that the utterance is true relative to a certain interpretation
andnot true relative to another interpretation. Anutterance cannot be called
true, full-stop, or false, full-stop. But the primary use of ‘true’ and ‘false’
does not stand in need of any relativization. e thing that is simpliciter
true or simpliciter false, true or false without relativization to anything, is
the thought expressed. e case of Annabella shows that one and the same
utterance can serve to express both something that is true, full-stop, and
something that is false, full-stop.
ere is no need for relativization to possible worlds, since something
is simpliciter true just in case it is true with respect to the actual world. So,
whatever is false with respect to the actual world, though true with respect to
some possible world, is simpliciter false. (As for the modal operators, Frege
adopts a Kantian stance. “e modality of judgements”, Kant wrote in his
rst Critique, “is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic
is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgement . . .but concerns
only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general” (KrV , B 100).
InBS, §4, Frege endorses the negative half of this claim, and he tries to clarify
its opaque second half. An utterance of ‘Necessarily, p’ expresses the thought
that p, nothing more and nothing less, but its speaker also indicates that
she takes it to be certain that p. An utterance of ‘Possibly, p’ also expresses
nothing but the thought that p, but its speaker also indicates that he takes it
not to be certain that ∼p.)
Admittedly, oen when a speaker says, ‘at is true’, she points, as it
were, at an utterance she just heard. But from this it does not follow that she
ascribes truth to that utterance. Pointing at a picture on the wall, you might
truly say, ‘at is a former president of the college,’ although fortunately the
honourable gentleman is not himself hanging on the wall. From the fact that
you are pointing at the picture it does not follow that you ascribe the property
of being a former president of the college to that picture. Suppose, somebody
makes an assertion by uttering sentence S, and you concede, ‘at is true,
but . . . ’. Some time later you are annoyed by another assertoric utterance
of S, and you reply wearily, ‘As I said half an hour ago, that is true, but . . . ’.
is rejoinder is absolutely correct: you did twice ascribe truth to one and
the same “thing”. So what is called ‘true’ in your comments is not a datable
speech episode. Pointing at a picture on the wall you refer to something else,
sc. to the person that is depicted there. Pointing to an utterance, you refer
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to something else, sc. to what is expressed by that utterance. In both cases
the object referred to is picked out by an act of (what Quine calls) deferred
ostension.
By identifying the thought expressed by an utterance with the sense of
the utterance, Frege does not identify the thought expressed by an utter-
ance with the meaning of the sentence uttered. Here is one reason: It is
the utterance of a sentence which is the primary bearer of sense, not the
type-sentence that is uttered, whereas it is the sentence uttered which is
the primary bearer of conventional linguistic meaning, that is, of lexico-
grammatical meaning. (A dictionary provides you with information about a
type-word, not about the inscription of that type-word you are staring at on
the pertinent page.) Here is another reason: Take a sentence that is neither
lexically nor syntactically ambiguous, ‘Today isMonday’.is sentence does
not change its conventional linguistic meaning from one day to the next, but
if you utter it on a Monday you express a truth, whereas you will no longer
do so when you utter it on the next day. Or take the lexico-grammatically
unambiguous sentence ‘is ship is the same as this’. Imagine three utter-
ances of this sentence, in each of them the rst two words are used to pick
out the same ship, but the rst utterance expresses a trivial truth, the sec-
ond an informative truth, and the third a falsehood. So, the Fregean sense
of an utterance containing indexicals or demonstratives is not the lexico-
grammatical meaning of the sentence uttered.
Does this identity obtain if the sentence uttered is free of context-sensitive
elements? No, it does not. If somebody says, ‘Many Boches spend their hol-
idays in Italy’, or ‘ere are many niggers in Brooklyn’, the same thoughts
would have been expressed if he had said, ‘ere aremanyNegroes in Brook-
lyn’, and ‘ManyGermans spend their holidays in Italy’, but in using the deroga-
tory terms the speaker betrays a less than friendly attitude towards certain
people. Like all such dierences in what Frege calls tone or colouration this
makes for a dierence in lexical meaning that ought to be preserved in a
good translation. Furthermore, a sentence may contain a word that can be
deletedwithout aecting the thought that is expressed by an utterance of that
sentence, but the conventional linguisticmeaning of the sentences is aected
by its deletion.2 Consider the beginning of Faust’s monologue, “I’ve studied,
alas, philosophy, jurisprudence, medicine,...”. Elimination of the interjection
‘alas’ would not aect the identity of the thought expressed.is word does
not have a Fregean sense, any more than the sound of the speaker’s voice
by means of which he might convey what ‘alas’ is used to convey has such a
sense. So it does not contribute anything to the thought that is expressed. An
expression may lack sense without lacking conventional linguistic meaning:
2 Cf. Ged, 63-4; N, 152 (140).
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aer all, ‘alas’ means the same as ‘ach’ in Goethe’s original. e same holds,
mutatis mutatis, for the word ‘yet’ in ‘Ann is ill, and yet she is in a very good
mood’: if it were eliminated the thought expressed would still be the same,
but the linguistic meaning would be dierent.
Is the Fregean sense of an utterance perhaps identical with the lexico-
grammatical meaning of the sentence uttered, if the sentences is free from
context-sensitive elements as well as free from colouration? As we shall see,
Frege’s views on truth imply that sometimes sense andmeaning diverge even
if these two conditions are met.
When I wrote my book I thought I had hit upon an argument which
demonstrates that the conventional linguistic meaning of a sentence should
never be identied with the thought (or proposition) expressed by an utter-
ance of that sentence. e argument, which is due to Richard Cartwright,
runs as follows (Künne 2005, 372):
What Ann said or thought may be plausible or implausible, remark-
able or trivial, well-supported or completely unsubstantiated, but a
sentential meaning does not have any of these virtues or vices. What
Ben thought or said may be conrmed or repudiated, endorsed or
challenged, it may be universally acknowledged or contradicted in
some quarters, but no sentence-meaning ever undergoes any of these
vicissitudes. What is said in an utterance of a sentence has ever so
many properties which are not shared by the meaning of the sen-
tence uttered even if the sentence is stable [that is, free from context-
sensitive elements, and I now add, from colouration]. Hence, by Leib-
niz’s Law, propositions are not sentential meanings.
Leibniz’s Law is the principle that
(LL) For all x, for all y, if x is identical with y, then x is-or-does what-
ever y is-or-does and vice versa.
At a later point I shall say a bit about the second quantier in the formal
rendering of this:
(LL*) ∀x∀y(x = y → ∀ϕ(ϕx ←→ ϕy))
Here is an example inwhich the invocation of this principle, ormore directly,
the invocation of what you get from (LL) by contraposition, is certainly jus-
tied:
(1) e author of Der Gedanke is German,
(2) e author of the Tractatus is not German. So, by LL,
(3) e author of Der Gedanke ≠ the author of the Tractatus.
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Now it very much looks as if the Cartwright-Künne argument, where ‘S’ can
be replaced by any declarative sentence, runs along the same lines:
(A) e thought expressed by Ann’s utterance of S is extremely implau-
sible.
(B) e meaning of S is not extremely implausible. So, by LL,
(C) e thought expressed by Ann’s utterance of S ≠ the meaning of S.
But now reect on the following scenario: You are a tourist visiting Wind-
sor Castle. At a distance you dimly see an animal on the lawn, you cannot
recognize it for what it is, but then you hear it bark, and you strongly dislike
its barking.is gives us your 1st premiss:
(α) e animal I saw on that lawn is a cur.
Your 2nd premiss is a statement you make on the basis of hear-say and of
prejudice:
(β) e Queen’s pet animal is not a cur (but a dog).
Does Leibniz’s Law now justify the following conclusion?
(γ) e animal I saw on that lawn ≠ the Queen’s pet animal.
Hopefully not, for as it so happens, the animal you saw on that lawn is
the Queen’s pet. e second premiss does not express the negation of the
thought that the Queen’s pet animal is a cur. Rather, in uttering (β) you indi-
cate that you are not prepared to use such derogatory terms in talking about
Her Majesty’s dog. In uttering (β) you distance yourself from the coloura-
tion of ‘e Queen’s pet animal is a cur’, not from the thought it expresses.
In natural languages what looks like the formulation of the negation of a
thought oen is not really anything of the sort. ‘is pizza is not large, it
is huge’, Ann says. Her rst utterance does not express the negation of the
thought that the pertinent pizza is large, for if it did Ann’s utterance would
be inconsistent. Aer all, whatever is huge is a fortiori large. By inserting a
‘not’ in ‘is pizza is large’ Ann distances herself from a claim that she nds
too weak, not from a claim she regards as false. When a teacher corrects a
child’s grammatical mistake by saying, ‘You did not see two gooses, you saw
two geese’, the teacher’s rst utterance does not express the negation of the
thought expressed by ‘You saw two gooses’, for this pseudo-sentence does
not express any thought whatsoever.
Back to the Cartwright-Künne argument. Its invocation of Leibniz’s Law
is only legitimate if the ‘not’ in premiss (B) does the contradictory-forming
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job of the negation operator. But perhaps in (B) it is rather an indicator of
one’s disapproval of a certain way of talking. To be sure, talk of “implausible
(well-supported, completely unsubstantiated) meanings” sounds odd, but a
critic of the argument can object that this is just the oddity of unusual talk,
not that of a glaring falsehood3. So the argument now appears to me less
strong than it once did.
2. Indenability
In his criticism of all attempts at dening truth Frege begins with a local ar-
gument that attacks a traditional object-based correspondence theory.at
is to say, the correspondence theorists criticized by Frege take the truth of,
say, the statement that the Cologne Cathedral has two spires (Frege’s exam-
ple) to consist in its correspondence to the Cologne Cathedral rather than
to the fact that the Cologne Cathedral has two spires.
Onemay wonder why Frege does not engage with fact-based correspon-
dence theories. Aer all, they were upheld by illustrious contemporaries in
Cambridge, and it is hard to imagine that this kind of viewwas never touched
upon when he had discussions with Wittgenstein in Jena and at the Baltic
Sea. Frege must have regarded this kind of view as a non-starter in the eld
of correspondence theories. (F.4) “What is a fact?”, he asks (Ged, 74), and his
answer is, “a fact is a thought that is true”. For a correspondence theorist what
a truth-bearer corresponds to has got to be distinct from the truth-bearer.
Of course, the Cantabrigians would have rejected Frege’s identication of
facts with truths. But there has been a heated debate about whether they,
or their latter-day Australian followers, ever succeeded in preventing facts
from collapsing into one. From a Fregean point of view, the Gödel-Church
argument, known under the nickname ‘the Slingshot’, is an attempt at show-
ing that if you believe in a plurality of facts you would better identify them
with true thoughts.)
I shall put Frege’s local argument against object-based correspondence
theories aside here, for it raises a host of exegetical issues. Let us focus in-
stead on his subsequent global argument according to which no explanation
of the concept of truth is adequate:
(F.5) And any other attempt also breaks down. For [1] in a denition
one would specify certain marks (Merkmale). And [2] when ap-
plying it to a particular case, the point at issue would always be
whether it were true that those marks were exemplied. So [3]
one would be going round in a circle. Hence [4] it seems likely
3 Schnieder (2004).
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that the content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indenable
(ganz einzigartig und undenierbar). (Ged, 60)
Many commentators have misconstrued this objection as a vicious innite
regress argument. [3] makes it as clear as can be that Frege takes himself
to be oering a kind of vicious circle objection. is does not mean that
he condemns all denitions of ‘true’ as circular denitions. A denition is
circular if the concept expressed by the deniendum is (openly or covertly)
expressed by a proper part of the alleged deniens.us ‘For all x, x rotates
i x moves around the axis of x’ is a covertly circular denition, for what
does ‘the axis of x’ mean if not: the line around which x rotates or might
rotate? e circle Frege is complaining of is not of this kind. Rather, it is a
circle one gets into as soon as one tries to apply the alleged deniens of ‘true’.
Unfortunately, as it stands the argument is enthymematic. So one must
try to nd the missing premisse(s) acceptance of which can reasonably be
ascribed to Frege. e denitions referred to in [1] are not what Frege calls
constructive (aufbauend) or stipulative denitions. Such a denition either
introduces a new expression for purposes of abbreviation (such as ‘pi-meson’
in physics) or forces an old expression into a new tightly circumscribed ser-
vice (e.g., ‘model’ in mathematics). No philosopher who tries to dene ‘true’
is aiming to gra a new meaning upon this old word. e denitions at is-
sue are rather dissecting (zerlegend) or analytic denitions which purport to
capture, by means of a compound expression, the sense of an atomic expres-
sion already in use.
Now according to Frege’s technical use of the term ‘mark’, M is a mark of
the concept expressed by a predicate P just in case the following conditions
are satised: M is a concept, M is expressed by a component of an analytic
denition of P, and nothing can fall under the concept expressed by P with-
out falling under M. is condition is met if and only if the deniens of P
is conjunctive. us, in virtue of the denition ‘For all x, x is a drake i (x
is a duck, and x is male)’, the concepts expressed by ‘male’ and by ‘duck’ are
marks of the concept expressed by ‘drake’. Such a denition pays epistemic
dividends, for it allows us to answer the question whether the deniens ap-
plies to an object via answering two simpler questions. Now Frege cannot
reasonably assume that each and every candidate for a deniens of ‘true’ has
the structure of a conjunction. e very denition he had been concerned
with in his local argument, ‘For all x, x is true i x corresponds with reality’,
lacked this kind of structure. So his use of the term ‘marks’ in [1] cannot be
the technical one of his earlier work. In [1] it cannot amount to more than to
the reasonable requirement that the alleged deniens is not atomic (unlike
that in ‘For all x, x is a serpent i x is a snake’).
But according to Frege one feature of conjunctive analytic denitions is
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shared by all adequate analytic denitions: they capture an order of epis-
temic priority,—we come to know that the deniendum applies to an object
through coming to know that the deniens applies to it. Consequently, a
candidate for the title of an analytic denition of a predicate P is to be re-
jected if having the concept expressed by P is a precondition for deciding
whether the alleged deniens applies in any given case. If we now assume,
as Frege does in [2], that one cannot decide whether the characteristics spec-
ied in an alleged deniens of ‘true’ are exemplied in a given case without
deciding whether it is true that they are exemplied, the conclusion in [3]
follows, for one can hardly decide whether something is thus and so (e.g.,
true) without having the concept of a thing’s being thus and so (of a thing’s
being true).
us understood, Frege’s argument crucially depends on the assumption
that one cannot decide whether the characteristics specied in an alleged
deniens of ‘true’ are exemplied in a given case without deciding whether
it is true that they are exemplied.is assumption is an instance of a more
general principle, which Frege seems to regard as self-evident:
(Decide) One cannot decide whether things are thus and so without de-
ciding whether it is true that things are thus and so.
In the next section we will see why Frege nds this obvious. It is noteworthy,
though seldom noted, that Frege’s phrasing in (F.5) [4], “it seems likely that
. . . ”, betokens that he himself does not regard the argument that precedes it
as a watertight proof of his indenability thesis.
3. e Identityesis
Already in his 1892 paperÜber Sinn und Bedeutung (34b), Frege maintained
that the sentence ‘e thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ expresses
the same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number’. He kept on repeat-
ing this kind of identity claim, using various examples: thus in his 1897
manuscript ‘Logic’ the Prussian reminiscence ‘Frederick the Great won the
battle of Rossbach’ (N, 153, (141)) serves the same purpose, and in Ged it is a
report of an irenic summery impression:
(F.6) It is also worth noticing that [1] ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has just
the same content as ‘It is true that I smell the scent of violets’. So it
seems that [2] nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to
it the property of truth. [. . . ] (Ged, 61c (6))
As regards the mathematical sentence, we are told that inserting it in what I
shall call the truth frame ‘e thought that ( ) is true’ makes no dierence to
the thought expressed. As regards examples like that in [1], we are told that
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applying what I shall call the truth prologue ‘It is true that ( )’ to them does
not aect the identity of the thought expressed. So apparently the syntactical
dierence between frame and prologue are deemed to be irrelevant. Surely,
all this is meant to generalize. Frege subscribes to the following identity
thesis:
(IDENTITY) Replace the sentence letter by any declarative sentence
you like, ‘It is true that p’ and ‘(e thought) that p is true’
express the same thought as the plain ‘p’.
I have taken the liberty of inserting the brackets into the truth frame, for
the identity thesis will have a greater chance of being correct if we delete this
noun-phrase. Otherwise somebodymight object: Look, ‘Snow is white’ does
not formally imply ‘ere is at least one thought’, whereas this is formally
implied by ‘e thought that snow is white is true’. So how can they express
the same thought?
One consequence of the identity thesis jumps into the eye: sense and
conventional linguistic meaning can diverge even if context-sensitivity and
colouration are absent. e lexico-grammatical meaning of ‘It is true that
5 is prime’ certainly diers from that of ‘5 is prime’, but Frege wants us to
believe that their utterances express the same thought, have the same sense.
Unlike colouring words like ‘alas’ and ‘yet’, the truth connectives do have
a sense, but Frege ascribes to their sense a truly remarkable property:
(F.7) e word ‘true’ has a sense that contributes nothing to the sense of
the whole sentence in which it occurs as a predicate. (N, 272 (252))
is formulation is a bit careless: rstly, because the word ‘true’ is not a pred-
icate but a general term, and secondly, because Frege’s claim can at best hold
of the truth connectives. So the contention can only be that it is their sense
which annihilates itself, as it were: they have a sense that makes no contri-
bution to the thoughts expressed by sentences containing them. In the third
of his ‘Logical Investigations’, entitled ‘Compound oughts’ (1923), Frege
maintains that ‘It is not the case that 5 is not prime’ has the same sense as
‘5 is prime’.4 Here, too, the idea seems to be that the sense of the operator
‘It is not the case that . . .not . . . ’ is self-eacing: this operator has a sense
that contributes nothing to the thought expressed by the whole sentence of
which it is a part. No wonder Davidson once nicknamed the redundancy
theory of truth ‘the double-negation theory of truth’.5
Note that Frege’s identity thesis is stronger than the equivalence claim
that all instances of the following biconditional schemata express truths:
4 Ggf , 44
5 Davidson (1984, 38)
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(Equivalence1) It is true that p, if and only if p
(Equivalence2) at p is true if and only if p.
e comma in (Equivalence1), almost universally forgotten, serves syntacti-
cal disambiguation. If you accept the identity thesis you should also endorse
the equivalence claim, but in the opposite direction there is no such obli-
gation: you can consistently deny that instances of ‘p’ and ‘it is true that p’
ever express the same thought while accepting instances of ‘It is true that p,
if and only if p’. Frege’s identity thesis entails, whereas the equivalence claim
does not entail, that all substitution-instances of the following schema come
out true:
(Act) One cannot VERB that / whether p, without thereby VERB-ing
that / whether it is true that p.
e capitalized dummy in (Act) can be replaced by verbs that are used in
ascriptions of propositionalmental acts-or-attitudes, such as ‘judge’, ‘believe’
and ‘wonder’, as well as by verbs that are used in reports of propositional
speech acts, such as ‘assert’, ‘swear’ and ‘ask’. (A structurally similar claim
can be found inHume: “Whateverwe conceive, we conceive to be existent”.6)
Obviously, ‘decide’ belongs to the former group, so (Decide), the principle
Frege tacitly appealed to in his argument for indenability, is a substitution-
instance of schema (Act).
In (Künne 2005, 226–236), I have argued that Frege’s identity thesis should
not be confused with its disquotational counterpart
(IDENTITY*) Replace the sentence letter by any declarative sentence
you like, “‘p’ is true” expresses the same thought as the
plain ‘p’.
e disquotational identity thesis is just false. Let me repeat my Argument
From Doxastic Dierence. Compare
(T) ‘Snow is white’ is true
(S) Snow is white
and pretend that sentences can without any further ado be called ‘true’. If
these sentences were to express the same thought nobody could believe what
either of them expresses without eo ipso believing what the other expresses.
But a monoglot Estonian who believes that snow is white may not believe
6 Treatise, I, 2, §6; cp. I, 3, §6
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that the English sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true, and if a monoglot Esto-
nian with defective eye-sight believes that snow is bluish but takes my word
for it that the English sentence is true, then he believes the sentence to be
true without believing snow to be white. Hence (S) and (T) do not express
the same thought. You cannot use an Argument From Doxastic Dierence
against Frege’s identity thesis. Replace (T) by
(U) It is true that snow is white.
e claim that somebody might believe that U without believing S would
be obviously false, and the reverse claim that somebody might believe that
S without believing U would just be a at denial of (Act).
If Frege’s partial criterion of identity for thoughts is adequate, then his
identity thesis can be justied by appeal to this criterion. Let me begin by
presenting the key notion in Frege’s criterion. Fromamanuscript of 1906 one
can extract a denition of a relation between sentences which Frege, some-
what misleadingly, calls equipollence and which I prefer to call Cognitive
Equivalence (F.8):7
(CE) Two sentences are cognitively equivalent if and only if nobody who
fully understands both can assent to one of them without imme-
diately being ready to assent to the other as well.
Dummett once maintained that (for a long time) Frege regarded cognitive
equivalence “as a sucient as well as necessary condition for identity of
sense”.8 But if cognitive equivalence were to guarantee identity of thought,
Frege would have to swallow some intuitively bizarre consequences which
are certainly not acceptable to him. e sentences ‘A rose is a rose’ and
‘Nothing is larger than itself ’ are cognitively equivalent, since the content
of either sentence is such that (to use Frege’s own words) “it would have to
be immediately accepted as true by anyone who had grasped it properly”.9
7 Frege writes
(F.8) “Two sentences A and B can stand in such a relation that anyone who accepts
the content of A as true must straightaway accept the content of B as true, and
conversely, that anyone who accepts the content of B as truemust immediately
accept that of A as true (equipollence). It is here being assumed that there is
no diculty in grasping the content of A and B . . . ” (N, 213 (197)).
‘Equipollence’ is standardly used in the sense of ‘logical equivalence’, and clearly sentences
that are logically equivalent do not always comply with the condition Frege outlines.
8 Dummett (1991b, 171); cf. his Dummett (1991a, 294, 298, 301); Dummett (1993, 99). He no
longer maintains this: see Dummett (1997, 247–248)
9 Timothy Williamson has argued in his Williamson (2006) that no logical truth and no
sentence which can by exchange of synonyms be transformed into a logical truth is such
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Hence if cognitive equivalence were a sucient condition of sameness of
thought, then our two sentences would express the same thought. All sen-
tences the contents of which simply defy disbelief would express one and
the same thought. In other words, there would be only one thought that is
“self-evident (unmittelbar einleuchtend)”.10 Surely Frege’s conception of an
axiom does not allow him to accept this result. Furthermore, any conjunc-
tion one conjunct of which expresses a self-evident truth would express the
same thought as the other conjunct by itself, e.g.
(A) e moon is round
(B1) e moon is round, and nothing is larger than itself.
None of these consequences are forthcoming if Frege takes cognitive equiv-
alence only to be a necessary condition for identity of thought. And so he
does, and like many others I follow suit.
We can gather what Frege regards as a Sucient Identity Condition from
the very same manuscript from which I culled CE (F.9):11
that one cannot understand it without straightaway being ready to assent to it. (Obviously,
Williamson regards sentences as truth-value bearers.) Even if his argument were sound it
would not justify his conclusion that “there is no conceptual truth”. His argument depends
on nding or inventing some relevant form of logical unorthodoxy. One gathers that this
will be a dicult feat in the case of instances of ‘If p and q, then q’. But in any case, no logical
unorthodoxy can undermine a competent speaker’s readiness to assent to ‘Nothing is larger
than itself ’, for this sentence does not belong to either of the two categories Williamson
considers. But it seems that logical unorthodoxy can undermine a speaker’s readiness to
assent to (a), ‘Socrates is wise’, once she has assented to (b), ‘It is not the case that Socrates
is not wise’. (To prevent distraction by other problems, let us assume that Socrates is one
of our contemporaries.) For Frege and all adherents of classical logic, every instance of
‘If ∼∼ p, then p’ expresses a truth, whereas intuitionist logicians contest that. At least in
mathematics, they maintain, a statement X is stronger than its double negation, because,
so they argue, a proof of the latter is a proof that one cannot disprove X, and that does
not amount to a proof of X. Would an advocate of intuitionist logic, who took this to be a
reason for withholding assent from (a) aer having assented to (b), thereby show that he
does not fully understand at least one of these sentences? Is his understanding somewhat
impaired by “Dutch” indoctrination? One can deny this without simply giving up the claim
that (a) and (b) are cognitively equivalent. If one takes classical and intuitionist logicians
to understand ‘not’ dierently, one canmaintain that (1c) is cognitively equivalent with (a)
under the former reading of ‘not’.
10 1914b, 242 (224).
11 Frege writes
(F.9) “. . . I assume that there is nothing in the content of either of the two equipollent
sentences . . . that would have to be at once immediately accepted as true by
anyone who had grasped it properly . . . [e thought expressed] is the same in
equipollent sentences of the kind given above (N, 213-4 (197-8), my italics).
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(SIC) Two sentences express the same thought if
(i) they are cognitively equivalent, ∧
(ii) neither of them is, or contains a part which is, such that one
cannot fully understand it without immediately being ready to
assent to it—or without immediately being ready to dissent from
it.
By adding condition (ii), up to ‘—’,12 Frege forestalls the intuitively bizarre
results I pointed out. Now one would not like to say of each disjunction
one disjunct of which expresses a thought that self-evidently lacks truth
(e.g. (B2), ‘e moon is round, or something is larger than itself ’) that it
expresses the same thought as the other disjunct by itself. So I took the lib-
erty of adding the dissent clause. (According to Frege, a thought can lack
truth without being false. So he should allow for cases in which a thought
self-evidently lacks truth although it is not false. e thought that the nat-
ural number between 5 and 6 is greater than 4, ts this bill, and so does the
thought that the round square on this blackboard is white. Consequently, we
must allow for cases of dissent that do not amount to imputations of falsity.)
Unfortunately, SIC still allows for cases that should be as unwelcome as
those which motivated clause (ii) and for a very similar reason.us
(a) Something is round
does not seem to express the same thought as (b1) or (b2):
(b1) Something is round and not larger than itself
(b2) Something is round or larger than itself.
Aer all, it would be wildly implausible not to treat the pair {(a), (b1)}, say,
in the same way as {(A), (B1)}. But neither (b)-sentence contains a part that
is excluded by SIC(ii).is objection, which is due to Ian Rumtt,13 may be
a reason not for despair but for taking a deeper breath. Aer all, the (b)-
sentences contain an unsaturated conjunct, or disjunct, whose saturation by
a non-empty singular term always results in a sentence which one cannot
fully understand without immediately being ready to assent to it or to dis-
sent from it. So such pairs could be taken care of by a third clause covering
unsaturated conjuncts and disjuncts.
But let us put this complication aside. ere is, of course, a price to
be paid for shielding o the various odd consequences of taking cognitive
12 Bermúdez (2001, 90) thinks that SIC(ii), up to ‘—’, is meant to exclude logical truths. But
it does not exclude all logical truths, and it does not only exclude logical truths (as witness
‘Nothing is larger than itself ’).
13 Rumtt (1994, 609).
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equivalence by itself to be sucient for sameness of thought: SIC is silent on
sentences the content of which is, or contains a part which is, self-evidently
(un)true. Never mind, SIC, if correct, suces for justifying Frege’s identity
thesis.
But then, how plausible is SIC? If you accept it you have to concede not
only that in the same context (1) and (2) express the same thought:
(1) On the blackboard behind me there is a diagram that is square
(2) It is true that on the blackboard behind me there is a diagram that
is square,
but also that (1) and (3) have the same propositional content:
(3) Anyone who were to believe that (1) would believe something that
is true.
But somebody may very well believe that (1) without believing that (3). And
that should suce by Frege’s own lights for rejecting the identication of the
thoughts expressed by (1) and (3), for he maintains that in a true instance
of ‘N.N. believes that p’ the sentence in the that-clause can be replaced salva
veritate by a sentence expressing the same thought. Or consider (1) and
(4) On the blackboard behindme there is a parallelogram that is square.
Once again, somebody may very well believe that (1) without believing that
(4), and that should suce by Frege’s own lights for rejecting the identica-
tion of the thoughts expressed by (1) and (4). I conclude from this that Frege
cannot convincingly defend his identity thesis by appeal to SIC.
Everybody except Davidson,14 I am inclined to think, would concede
that a believer in (1) need not have mastered the concept of belief, which
one needs to have in order to believe that (3). And everybody will agree
that a believer in (1) need not have the concept of a parallelogram in his or
her repertoire, without which one cannot believe that (4). Let me now con-
trast, more or less in the same way as I did in (Künne 2005, 42–52), cognitive
equivalence with another relation between sentences that registers this dif-
ference:
(CB) Two sentences s and s′ are conceptually balanced if and only if
(i) there is no concept whose mastery has to be exercised in (oc-
currently) understanding s but not in (occurrently) understand-
ing s′, ∧
(ii) there is no concept whose mastery has to be exercised more
14 Davidson (1984, 170)
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oen in (occurrently) understanding s than in (occurrently) un-
derstanding s′.
You possess a concept, as this term is used in CB, if you fully understand
an expression the sense of which is that concept.15 You occurrently under-
stand the sentence ‘Five is prime’ only at those times at which you actually
entertain the thought that ve is prime, whereas you can at any time cor-
rectly be said to understand that sentence provided your English is good
enough.16 Clause (ii) is meant to ensure that no cognitive balance obtains
between ‘Donald is a drake’ and its pleonastic counterpart ‘Donald is a male
drake’. Two sentences may be cognitively equivalent without being concep-
tually balanced, as witness pairs (1), (3) and (1), (4). Two sentences may be
conceptually balanced without being cognitively equivalent, as witness
(5) e sun is larger than the Earth
(6) e Earth is larger than the sun.
A look at the same pair suces to see that conceptual balance is not a suf-
cient condition for two sentences expressing the same thought. But, like
Dummett,17 I take it that conceptual balance is a necessary condition for
two sentences expressing the same thought. Now what about correspond-
ing instances of ‘p’ and ‘It is true that p’? Are they conceptually balanced?
Even if it were the case that that one cannot understand any assertoric sen-
tence without having mastered the concept of truth (I shall confront this
issue in §6), this would not show that one has to actually exercise one’s mas-
tery of this concept when one occurrently understands, e.g., ‘It is snowing’.
I for one cannot see that one has to do that, and if that is not due to short-
sightedness on my part, then not only do (corresponding instances of) ‘p’
and ‘It is true that p’ not express the same thought, but, because of clause (ii)
of CB, ‘It is true that p’ and ‘It is true that it is true that p’ (etc.) do not do so
either—just as Bolzano thought.18
4. Redundancy of Truth (in English)
Recall my last quotation from (Ged):
15 In this paper ‘concept’ is not used in the technical way Frege uses it most of the time, i.e. as
applying to functions from objects to truth-values. Most of the time, but not always: when
he says in (N, 273 (253)), ‘I do not start from concepts and put them together to form a
thought . . .out of them; rather I come by the parts of a thought by splitting up (Zerfällung)
the thought,’ he means by ‘concept’ the sense of a predicate rather than its signication
(Bedeutung).
16 Cf. Dummett (1993, 58–60, 101–3, 109, 133).
17 Dummett 1991, 295
18 Cp. Bolzano (1837, vol. 2, 357, 370, 374)
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(F.6) It is also worth noticing that [1] ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has just
the same content as ‘It is true that I smell the scent of violets’. So it
seems that [2] nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to
it the property of truth. [. . . ]
e remark in [2] is a bit mysterious. Aer all, we never “add” anything to an
object when we ascribe a property to it. (Again, a structurally similar claim
can be found in Hume: “e idea of existence . . . , when conjoin’d with the
idea of any object, makes no addition to it”.19 ) We can see what Frege is up
to whenwe compare two sentences instantiating ‘It is well known that p’ and
‘It is true that p’. In an utterance of the former sentence, more is expressed
than the thought that p, while in an utterance of the latter (if Frege is right)
nothing more is expressed than by the plain ‘p’. So in [2] Frege puts forward
a redundancy claim. Consider a philosophically neutral example: you would
not add anything to the claim you make by uttering, ‘I foretold that’, if you
were to say instead, ‘I foretold that beforehand’: the adverb is propositionally
superuous. Similarly, if Frege is right, the truth frame in ‘(e thought) that
5 is a prime number is true’ and the truth prologue in ‘It is true that I smell
the scent of violets’ are propositionally redundant: they do not add anything
to the thoughts expressed by the embedded sentences.
Frege presents [2] as if it were a consequence of [1]. But his identity thesis
cuts both ways. One can also use it to argue for the omnipresence of truth.
Whatever statement I make, in making it I ascribe the property of truth to
the thought expressed by my utterance. And in virtue of (Act) what holds
for acts of stating holds for all propositional acts-or-states, be they mental
or illocutionary: truth is present all over the place.
Truth frame and truth prologue are one-place sentence-forming oper-
ators on sentences, unary connectives like the negation operator: for one
sentence as input they deliver another sentence as output. In order to save
breath, I shall henceforth subsume both prologue and frame under the label
‘truth-connective’. Now even if it were true that a truth-connective can always
be deleted from a sentence without detriment to the thought expressed, this
does not show that the predicate ‘is true’ is redundant. Consider the example
Frege himself gives in (Ged) when he continues, aer (F.6):
(F.10) So it seems that [2] nothing is added to the thought bymy ascrib-
ing to it the property of truth. [3] And yet, is it not a great result
when the scientist aer much hesitation and laborious researches
can nally say ‘My conjecture is true’? [. . . ]
If one were to delete the truth-predicate from the scientist’s exclamation
in [3], the remainder would no longer express any thought, let alone the
19 Treatise, I, 2, §6.
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thought expressed by the non-mutilated utterance. e same holds for all
unrevealing truth-ascriptions, that is, for all truth-ascriptions that do not
‘reveal’ (express) the thoughts for which they claim truth. Some are singu-
lar, e.g.
(S) Goldbach’s Conjecture is true
or ‘What Goldbach conjectured is true’. Some unrevealing truth-ascriptions
are general, e.g.
(G) Whatever the Party says is true.
If things really are as (S) says they are, then some substitution instance of
‘Goldbach Conjectured that p, and indeed p’ must express a truth. But since
none of us understands each and every English sentence there are instances
of that schema we do not understand, hence a fortioriwe do not understand
their innite disjunction. Nevertheless, we easily understand (S). Since we
cannot use an innite disjunction for saying what we want to say with (S),
the equivalence of an innite disjunction with (S) lends no support to the re-
dundancy claim.e same holdmutatis mutandis for (G). If things really are
as (G) says they are, then each conditional of the form ‘If the Party says that
p, then p’ must express a truth, but for each of us there are instances of that
schema we do not understand, hence a fortiori we do not understand their
innite conjunction. And yet, we easily understand (G). Once again, since
we cannot use an innite conjunction for saying what we want to say with
(G), the equivalence of an innite conjunction with (G) lends no support to
the redundancy claim. All in all, a truth-predicate that can be employed in
unrevealing truth-ascriptions, seems to be indispensable.
But can we not use the sentential quantication
(Sq) For some p, Goldbach’s Conjecture is (the thought) that p, and p
for saying what we want to say with (S)? Surely, Frege does not object to
quantication into sentence position. (Of course, if (Sq) were to be un-
derstood as an abbreviation for the innite disjunction of the substitution-
instances of the open sentence to the right of the quantier, this is no step
forward.) In any case, we obtain a predicate from (Sq) when we replace the
name ‘Goldbach’s Conjecture’ by the variable ‘x’, and this predicate, I would
say, is a truth-predicate. (It is the very predicate by which MOD denes ‘x
is true’. (see Künne 2005, 337) So the move to (S*) does not demonstrate the
dispensability of all truth predicates.
Now one would not like to conclude from this that ‘true’ as it occurs in
(S) has a dierent sense than as it occurs in the revealing truth-ascription
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(R) It is true that each even number greater than 2 is the sum of two
prime numbers
which expresses Goldbach’s Conjecture. We can avoid this conclusion by
construing the ‘it’ in the truth-connective cataphorically—along the lines of
the ‘he’ in ‘He was wise, the man who drank the hemlock’ or the ‘it’ in ‘It
is true what Socrates said in the court’. en (R) is just a stylistic variant of
‘at each even number etc. is true’, and we can now construe both in the
same way as their unrevealing counterpart (S): as predications.
If we assume that all revealing truth-ascriptions are instances of the schema
‘Fa’, one can easily budget for the intuition that the following argument is for-
mally valid:
(S) Goldbach’s Conjecture is true.
(T) at each even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime num-
bers is Goldbach’s Conjecture.erefore,
(U) at each even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime num-
bers is true.
One can say that this argument exemplies the valid argument-pattern
Fa, b = a ∴ Fb.
Frege himself states quite generally:
(F.11) An abstract noun-clause (abstrakter Nennsatz) [i.e. a that-clause]
[can be] regarded as a noun (Nennwort), indeed one could say:
as a proper name (Eigenname) of that thought as whose name it
entered into the context of the compound sentence. (SuB, 37, 39)
But he applies this only to indirect speech reports and to propositional act-
or-attitude ascriptions, that is, to compound sentences inwhich the sentence
prexed with ‘that’ cannot always be exchanged salva veritate by another
sentence that expresses a thought with the same truth-value. Obviously, in-
stances of ‘It is true that p’ or of ‘at p is true’ are not compound sentences
of this kind, for here an exchange of a truth (falsehood) by any other truth
(falsehood) will leave the truth-vale of the whole unaected. But then, the
same holds for instances of ‘If somebody were to believe that p, he or she
would be right’, which do contain an attitude ascription. Furthermore, truth
ascriptions interact with propositional attitude reports, as witness the com-
pound sentence
(Z) It is true that Socrates is wise, but Xanthippe does not believe it
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or the argument
(A) Plato believes that Socrates is wise, and it is true that Socrates is
wise.erefore, Plato believes at least one thing that is true.
e anaphoric pronoun in (Z) harks back to the preceding that-clause, and
what does this pronoun do if not pick up the reference of this clause? Intu-
itively, (A) is a formally valid argument, and just that is its regimentation as
an instance of
Fa ∧ Ga ∴ ∃x (Fx∧ Gx).
So, there are good reasons for applying Frege’s general statement about ab-
stract noun-clauses to truth-ascriptions and hence for assigning to the latter
the logical form of a predication.
But this logical-form proposal would not meet with Frege’s approval. In
our main text he reaches the tentative conclusion:
(F.12) [4] So the meaning of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether sui
generis. [5] May we not be dealing here with something that is
not a property (Eigenscha) in the ordinary sense at all? [. . . ]
Less tentatively he had put the same point already in SuB 34–35, and he re-
peated it unequivocally in a manuscript of 1906:
(F.13) If we say ‘the thought is true’, we seem to be ascribing truth to
the thought as a property. If that were so, we would have a case
of subsumption. e thought as an object would be subsumed
under the concept of the true. But herewe aremisled by language.
We do not have the relation of an object to a property (Wir haben
nicht das Verhältnis des Gegenstandes zur Eigenscha) [. . . ]. (N,
210 (194))
ere is no evidence whatsoever that Frege ever gave up this position. But
what reason(s) did he have for rejecting the ‘subsumption view’ that I, like
most philosophers, favour?
His argument for this rejection is what I shall call an Argument From
Assertoric Force. Recall what we have read in
(F.10) So it seems that [2] nothing is added to the thought bymy ascrib-
ing to it the property of truth. [3] And yet, is it not a great result
when the scientist aer much hesitation and laborious researches
can nally say ‘My conjecture is true’? [. . . ]
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Frege’s own point in [3] was not the trouble which I believe unrevealing
truth-ascriptions cause for his view. In the situation described in [3], the
speaker can easily replace the unrevealing truth-ascription by a revealing
one: aer all, it is his conjecture. Frege’s concern was a quite dierent ten-
sion: If the use of ‘true’ is apparently superuous, see [2], how can truth
claims matter so much to scientists when they are bringing in the harvest
of their researches? Frege might as well have posed this question by putting
a revealing truth-ascription into the mouth of the scientist: Imagine an ex-
cited Goldbach writing to Euler, ‘Last night I have found the proof for my
conjecture: it is true that each even number greater than 2 is the sum of
two primes’. (Do not be misled by the English word ‘scientist’: a mathemati-
cian is aWissenschaler, and for Frege mathematics is theWissenscha par
excellence.) Now the revealing rephrasal of the exclamation can help us to
understand how Frege tries to alleviate the tension. In Ged he repeats an
argument from SuB to the eect that the use of ‘true’ is assertively redun-
dant, and his argument is entirely convincing as long as we stick to revealing
truth ascriptions. If an utterance of an assertoric sentence is made by an
actor on the stage or if it is embedded in an (assertoric) utterance of a con-
ditional or of a disjunction, then it is not an assertion, no matter whether it
contains a truth-connective or not. And an utterance which does contain
a truth-connective and which is an assertion would not have lost its asser-
toric force if the speaker had decided not to use the truth-connective. How
is the undeniable assertorical redundancy of truth frame and truth prologue,
which concerns the illocutionary role of an utterance, related to their alleged
propositional redundancy, which concerns the content of an utterance? e
former explains the latter, Frege contends in Ged:
(F.14) An advance in science usually takes place in thisway: rst a thought
is grasped, and thus may perhaps be expressed in a yes-no ques-
tion; aer appropriate investigations, this thought is nally recog-
nized to be true. We declare the acknowledgement of truth (An-
erkennung der Wahrheit) in the form of an assertoric sentence.
We do not need the word ‘true’ for this. And even when we do
use it, the real assertoric force (behauptende Kra) does not lie
in it, but in the form of the assertoric sentence; and where this
form loses its assertoric force, the word ‘true’ cannot put it back
again. . .is explains why it is that nothing seems to be added to
a thought by attributing a property to it. (Ged, 62–63)
At the end of this passage Frege uses the language of attributing a property
which he deems to be at bottom inappropriate. In SuB he used the same
premisses to argue against the ‘subsumption view’:
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(F.15) From this one may conclude that the relation of the thought to
the true must not be compared with that of subject to predicate.
(SuB, 34)
Apparently, the Argument From Assertoric Force is supposed to run as fol-
lows.
(I) If truth were a bona de property of some thought θ, then grasping
the thought that θ is true would be: acknowledging θ as true, and
predicating truth of θ would be: putting θ forward as true.
(II) But neither of these alleged identities holds. Hence, by modus tol-
lens,
(III) Truth is not a bona de property of any thought.
e argument is clearly valid, and Frege has shown that premiss (II) is true.
But since I cannot see any good reason for accepting premiss (I), I deny that
the Argument From Assertoric Force is sound. We can think of a thought
as falling under the truth concept without thereby acknowledging its truth.
Aer all, that is exactly what happens when wonders whether the thought is
true. One can predicate truth of the thought that p, without thereby putting
that thought forward as true, i.e. without thereby asserting that p. Aer all,
that is exactly what happens when one asks somebody whether that thought
is true. Admittedly, the presence of the grammatical predicate in an utter-
ance of the form ‘e thought that p is true’ does not ensure that the ut-
terance is an assertion (see below, §7). Nevertheless, it might be a logical
predicate that serves the purpose of subsuming a thought under the truth
concept. Frege has not shown that the subsumption view is false.
It remains to be seen how attractive his alternative to this view is. (I
regret to have treated it only perfunctorily in Künne (2005).)
5. e True ande False
In Ged Frege does not actually present his alternative view, nor did he do
so in the subsequent two ‘Logical Investigations’. e project was not yet
completed when he died in 1925. So the LI, as we have them, do not keep the
promise made at the end of
(F.16) [5]May we not be dealing here with something that is not a prop-
erty in the ordinary sense at all? [6] In spite of this doubt I shall
for the time being expressmyself in accordance with ordinary us-
age, as if truth were a property, until somethingmore appropriate
(etwas Zutreenderes) is found. (Ged, 62)
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But actually, Frege had developed many years earlier a conception of truth
that he deemed more appropriate, and there is not the slightest reason for
thinking that he ever changed his mind in this respect. His preferred alter-
native to the subsumption view is mentioned in the continuation of (F.13)
that I have so far suppressed:
(F.17) We do not have the relation of an object to a property, but that of
the sense (Sinn) of a sign to its signication (Bedeutung). (N, 210
(194))
Let me try to explain, and to evaluate, this conception. Here are four ques-
tions each of which is answered armatively by Frege:
(i) Are some assertoric sentences such that they do not only express a
thought (sense) but also have a signication (Bedeutung)?
(ii) Is the signication of a sentence a truth-value?
(iii) Are truth-values objects?
(iv) Does a sentence stand to its truth-value in the same semantic rela-
tion in which the name ‘Socrates’ stands to the man Socrates?
In (SuB, 33–34) we hear Frege say four times, Yes. It is worth going through
this text sentence by sentence.
(F.18a) [1] We have seen that there must always be sought a signica-
tion (Bedeutung) for a sentence whenever the signication of its
components matters; and this is the case when and only when
we are inquiring aer the truth-value.
Here Frege summarizes the preceding argument for his answer to the rst
question. His argument presupposes that we already have a conception of
what it is for a singular term to have a signication. If all goes well, a singular
term “signies or designates (bedeutet oder bezeichnet)” an object, and this
object “may be called its signication (Bedeutung)” (SuB, 26, 31).20
20 Apparently Frege wanted to use as title for the object signied a verbal noun derived from
one of the two verbs which he uses interchangeably in SuB, 31 (He no longer does so in
(GG I, §2). See §6 below). He could not use the noun derived from ‘bezeichnen’, since a
Bezeichnung is a linguistic sign. So he did the next best thing and stipulated a special use
for the verbal noun ‘Bedeutung’.e next best thing is not always a good thing, and the fact
that the German words ‘Bedeutung’ and ‘Sinn’ are oen used as stylistic variants of each
other is a serious disadvantage. Clearly, Frege thought that he had obviated the imminent
confusions by the way he introduced the term into his theoretical vocabulary.—He seems
not to be aware of the fact that already his use of the verb ‘bedeuten’ as interchangeable with
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A singular term lacks signication if not all goes well, that is, if there
is no object which it signies. Now in the argument for the armative
answer to the rst question we were meant to understand ‘signication’ in
such a way that the following two statements come out true: [a] A sentence
that expresses a thought has no signication, if it contains a singular term
that does not signify anything, and [b] two sentences that express dierent
thoughts have the same signication (if any), if one can be transformed into
the other by exchanging an embedded singular term for another that has
the same signication.—ese are not an arbitrary stipulations. Consider a
complex singular term like ‘the largest Moon of Vulcan’: [a*] A complex sin-
gular term that expresses a sense has no signication, if it contains a singular
term that does not signify anything.21 Consider a pair of complex singular
terms like ‘the father of Jean BaptisteMolière’ and ‘the father of Jean Baptiste
Pocquelin’: [b*] Two singular terms have the same signication (if any), if
one can be transformed into the other by exchanging an embedded singular
term for another that has the same signication. Frege is appealing here to
his principle of compositionality as regards signication: the signication of
a semantically complex expression is determined by the signication of its
components and the way it is composed from them.
Now what does the signication of a sentence consist in? We care for a
sentence’s components having signication, Frege had argued in the para-
graphs preceding [1], when it matters to us whether the sentence expresses a
truth or a falsehood. And when we ask whether it expresses a true thought
or a false one, we do what is called in [1] “inquiring aer its truth-value”.
From here Frege goes on to answer the second question on our list:
(F.18b) [2] We are therefore driven into accepting the truth-value of a
sentence as its signication (Bedeutung).
is is not a deductively justied step, and it is not meant to be one. On the
basis of the preceding reections one might as well say that the signication
of a sentence (if it has one) is a state of aairs. e sentence ‘Molière died
on the stage’, one could argue, represents the same state of aairs as the sen-
tence ‘Pocquelin died on the stage’ (and since these sentences express true
‘bezeichnen’ is a possible source of confusion: In colloquial German the question, “Was
bedeutet ‘the inventor of bifocals’?” cannot be answered by saying ‘Benjamin Franklin’, but
only by a translation (or by a synonymous English phrase, ‘e personwho invented lenses
for spectacles’, or some such). ‘Benjamin Franklin’ would, however, be a decent reply to the
question “Was (wen) bezeichnet ‘the inventor of bifocals’?”
21 Some hard work needs to be done to protect this against prima facie counterexamples
like ‘this statue of Venus’, ‘that worshipper of Baal’, ‘Meinong’s obsession with the round
square’. e complex singular term must not invoke aboutness or intentionality, but how
is this restriction to be captured semantically?
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thoughts that state of aairs is a fact): cf. Künne (2005, 11–12, 116, 139, 253).
And the sentence ‘Vulcan has several moons’ does not represent any state
of aairs, not even a non-obtaining one, because ‘Vulcan’ is a singular term
without signication. Of course, Frege could not say any of this, for, as we
saw in (F.4), he identies facts with true thoughts, and hence he would be
ready to identify states of aairswith thoughts. But thatmight only show that
he has deprived the category States of Aairs of a useful service, as Husserl
and Armstrong (a rather unlikely couple, I admit) would say. Now Frege
does not claim in [2] that his reply to the second question is implied by the
reections that precede it, and later on in SuB he calls his answer twice a
“conjecture” (35, 36).
[2] does not commit Frege to giving an armative answer to the third
question on our list. Aer all, the term ‘truth-value’ might occur only in
contexts of the following two types:
(α) Sentence S has a truth-value
(β) Sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth-value,
and such formulations might just serve as handy abbreviations of
(α*) S expresses a true thought, or S expresses a false thought
(β*) S1 and S2 both express a true thought, or they both express a false
thought.
But then no objects that are not referred to in (α*) or (β*) are referred to in
(α) or (β).
In the continuation of our passage Frege rst tries to explain what badly
needs an explanation, the phrase ‘the truth-value of S’:
(F.18c) [3] By the truth-value of a sentence I understand the circum-
stance (Umstand) that it is true or that it is false. [4]ere are
no further truth-values. [5] For brevity I call the one the True
(das Wahre), the other the False (das Falsche).
Unfortunately, [3], of all things, is very confusing, and I am afraid that it is
confused. Clearly Frege does not understand by the truth-value of a sen-
tence the circumstance that makes it, or rather, that makes the thought that
it expresses, true or false. Firstly, he never appeals to the notion of a truth-
maker. Secondly, the circumstance that makes the thought that is expressed
by ‘Tallinn is the capital of Estonia’ true seems to be the circumstance that
Tallinn is the capital of Estonia, and that very same circumstance makes the
thought that is expressed by ‘Tallinn is the capital of Lithuania’ false. But
Frege wants to assign dierent truth-values to these two sentences.—ere
is a greater temptation to confound [3] with
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(∗) By the circumstance that a sentence has a truth-value I understand
the circumstance that it (expresses a thought that) is true or false.
is would be a rather round-about way of introducing the predicate ‘x has
a truth-value’. If that had been Frege’s point he would have done better to
drop reference to circumstances and to say simply,
(†) x has a truth-value i x (expresses a thought that) is true or false.
Now this suggests that talk of truth-values is just an abbreviatory device.
“It is convenient”, Quine says, “to speak of truth and falsity as truth-values;
thus the truth-value of a statement is said to be truth or falsity according as
the statement is true or false.”22 As it stands, (†) is ne with Frege, but if this
were all he is up to it would become incomprehensible why he introduces the
strange titles ‘the True’ and ‘the False’ in [5]. What he wants to elucidate in
[3] is not the predicate ‘x has a truth-value’ but singular terms of the type ‘the
truth-value of sentence S’.e disjunctive component of [3] is a contracted
disjunction of two open identity-sentences (along the lines of ‘e favourite
uncle of a girl is the brother of her father or the brother of her mother’):
(t-v) If a sentence x has a truth-value at all, then the truth-value of x is
the circumstance that it expresses a thought which is true, or the
truth-value of x is the circumstance that it expresses a thought
which is false.
[4] only emphasizes a consequence of (t-v), and in [5] Frege introduces the
term ‘the True’ (‘the False’) as a name for what the singular term ‘the truth-
value of S’ signies just in case S expresses a true (false) thought. So the
whole elucidatory weight lies on the shoulders of (t-v). But these shoul-
ders are not Christophorus-like. Frege relies on our understanding singular
terms of the type ‘the circumstance that p’. But on our ordinary understand-
ing, the circumstance that p (which may be a circumstance that must not
be neglected, that has to be taken into account, etc.) is identical with the
fact that p. But this cannot be what Frege means. For one thing, he takes
facts to be true thoughts, but truth-values are certainly not thoughts. Sec-
ondly, even if you believe in a plurality of facts (as Frege does) but reject
Frege’s conception of facts, you will reasonably deny that (the fact that the
sentence ‘eMoon is round’ expresses a truth) coincides with (the fact that
the sentence ‘Molière is dead’ expresses a truth), but Frege wants the term
‘truth-value’ to be understood in such a way that these two sentences (like
all others that express a true thought) have the same truth-value. So our or-
dinary understanding of the phrase ‘the circumstance that p’ does not help
22 Quine (1952, §2).
32 Frege on Truths, Truth and the True
us to grasp the sense which Frege wants to be connected with the singular
term ‘the truth-value of S’. Appealing to an extraordinary understanding of
that phrase would make (t-v) worse than useless.—Frege’s next step is a very
dubious inference:
(F.18d) [6] Every assertoric sentence for which the signication (Bedeu-
tung) of its words matters is therefore to be regarded as a proper
name (Eigenname), and its signication (Bedeutung), if it has
one, is either the True or the False.
Frege takes himself to be justied in giving a positive answer to the fourth
question on our list,
(iv) Does a sentence stand to its truth-value in the same semantic rela-
tion in which the name ‘Socrates’ stands to the man Socrates?
And if his answer is correct then our third question is also to be answered
armatively:
(iii) Are truth-values objects?
But one can consistently accept the claim that truth-values are objects which
are designated by singular terms of the type ‘the truth-value of S’, while re-
jecting the contention that they are also designated by sentences. A philoso-
pher, who believes that extensions are objects which are designated by sin-
gular terms of the type ‘the extension of predicate P’, can and should deny
that the predicates whose extensions they are also designate them. So why
not deny that the sentences truth-values are truth-values of stand to them
in the same semantic relation in which a name stands to its bearer?
Frege answers question (iv) armatively because this answer is implied
by his functional account of predicates. If the predicate ‘x is a university
town’ literally is what ‘the square of x’ literally is, namely a function-sign,
then in both cases a singular term as input delivers a singular term as output:
in the case of ‘x2’ the result of inserting the numeral ‘4’ designates a number,
in the predicational case the result of inserting the name ‘Tartu’ designates a
truth-value. As against this, I believe that predicates are onlymetaphorically
function-signs, expressions that can usefully be compared with function-
signs. Literally the predicate ‘x is a university town’ is an open sentence in
which a position is reserved for a singular term.is Quinean characteriza-
tion does not commit us to regarding the result of inserting a singular term
as a singular term.
When you judge that Tallinn lies at the Baltic you acknowledge not only
the existence of a town and of a sea, Frege contends, but also that of two
abstract objects, named the True and the False:
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(F.18e) [7]ese two objects are acknowledged, if only implicitly (still-
schweigend), by everybody who makes a judgement, who ac-
knowledges something as true, hence even by the sceptic.
e sceptic in [7] is not the ‘Pyrrhonian’ sceptic (of an old legend) who re-
frains from making any judgement but rather a ‘Cartesian’ sceptic who re-
frains from those judgements whose contents can only be true if there is an
external world or if there is more than one subject of mental states-or-acts.
Every self-styled nominalist can be expected to reject Frege’s contention
that each judgement commits us to those two abstract objects. Frege would
register this protest as a further manifestation of the “very widespread ten-
dency not to acknowledge as an object anything that cannot be perceived by
the senses” (FuB, 3). But in the vicinity of the claim in [7] there is a hum-
ble point which is not an ontological one: when one makes a judgement to
the eect that p one acknowledges the thought that p as true, and thereby
one incurs an obligation to reject the thought that not-p as false; and when
one makes a judgement to the eect that ∼p one acknowledges the thought
that ∼p as true, and thereby one incurs an obligation to reject the thought
that p as false. I endorse this claim. It does not imply that one cannot make
a judgement unless one has mastered the concepts of truth and falsity. One
can incur an obligationwithout being able to articulate it. In the early phases
of our cognitive development wemake judgements (saying in our heart, ‘Lo,
it is snowing’), but we do not yet have the conceptual equipment for making
judgements about the contents of our judgements. We can explain to chil-
dren what ‘true’ means by giving them instructions such as ‘If you say, “It
is raining”, and it is raining, then what you say is true. But if you say, “It is
raining”, and it is not raining, then what you say is not true. Or if you say, “It
is snowing”, and it is snowing, then what you say is true. But if you say, “It
is snowing”, and it is not snowing, then what you say is not true. Got it, dar-
ling?’ To understand such an explanation, the child must, of course, already
understand sentences such as ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is snowing’. Whether the
child ‘got it’ will becomemanifest in his or her future use of ‘true’. (Cf. Künne
2005, 51f) Dowe have to assume that in such lessons the child only acquires a
word to express a concept that is already in his or her conceptual repertoire?
I have come to think that this is (at least partially) an empirical question for
developmental psychology. As an armchair psychologist who is fond of tak-
ing risks I bet that it takes children, who are pretty good at saying what the
weather outdoors is like, quite a while until they become receptive to such
meta-lessons.
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6. e Omnipresence of Truth (in a Begrisschri)
An essay on the topic ‘Frege on Truth’ is a Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark if it does not deal with the language which Frege deems to be the
ideal medium for rational thinking, his ideography (Begrisschri). I shall
consider only his mature account of this language that is to be found in his
ill-starred opusmagnum,Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arith-
metic).is account presupposes the view that the truth-value of a sentence
is an object that is designated by that sentence.
While sentences in a language like English are primarily series of sounds,
recall (F.1), sentences in an ideography are always, unsurprisingly, inscrip-
tions. In a language like English there is no absolutely reliable indicator
whereby one can recognize whether an utterance or an inscription has asser-
toric force. In Frege’s ideography there is a special sign the presence, or ab-
sence, of which at the le-hand side of an inscriptionmakes unambiguously
clear whether the inscription is to be understood as having, or as lacking,
assertoric force.
(F.19) I am not asserting anything when I merely write down an equa-
tion, but only designating (bezeichnen) a truth-value, just as I am
not asserting anything when I merely write down ‘22’, but merely
designating a number. (GG I, §5)
Note that here it is not the sign that is said to designate something but rather
the user of the sign. (By contrast, only of signs it is said in GG that they
signify (bedeuten) something.) If you want to make an assertion in BS you
must put a vertical stroke on the le-hand side of a series of signs, the so-
called “judgement-stroke (Urteilsstrich)”. Here are four examples of what an
ideographic sentence, a Begrisschrisatz, looks like:⊢2 + 3 = 5 ⊢2
⊢e Earth is larger than the Moon ⊢e Earth
While an inscriber of ‘2 + 3 = 5’, using this as an ideographical symbol, does
not yet assert anything, but only designates a truth-value, (an inscriber of)
(F.20) ‘⊢2 + 3 = 5’ does not designate anything, but asserts something.
(FuB, 22, n)
How is the horizontal part of the prex to be understood? It follows from
Frege’s explanation that the horizontal stroke can be read as the predicate
‘is identical with the True’.23 By putting only the horizontal in front of ‘2 +
23 FuB, 21; GG I, §5 & n. 3.
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3 = 5’ (‘e Earth is larger than the Moon’) you non-committally say that
the truth-value of the thought that 2 + 3 = 5 (that the Earth is larger than
the Moon) is the True. If you then add the judgement-stroke you assert
that this identity obtains. By placing only the horizontal in front of ‘2 + 3
= 4’ (‘e Moon is larger than the Earth’) you non-committally say that the
truth-value of the thought that 2 + 3 = 4 (that the Moon is larger than the
Earth) is the True. So far you have not yet committed a mistake. If you then
add the judgement-stroke you falsely assert that this identity obtains. Simi-
larly, by prexing both horizontal and vertical to the numeral ‘2’ (the name
‘the Earth’) you assert something that is false. Each and every ideographic
sentence begins with the horizontal, so each and every ideographic sentence
contains a truth-predicate in the guise of ‘is identical with the True’, and each
and every thought expressed by an ideographic sentence is about the truth-
value True. So, truth is omnipresent. Of his ideography Frege can rightly
say:
(F.21) What distinguishes [the truth predicate] from all other predicates
is that predicating it is always included in predicating anything (es
wird immermit ausgesagt, wenn irgend etwas ausgesagt wird). (N,
140 (129))
(Here the Oxford translation gets it exactly right: ‘aussagen’ in Frege does
not mean what it oen means in colloquial German: to assert, but rather:
to predicate. Predications need not have assertoric force.) Or does the hori-
zontal perhaps have a self-annihilating sense? No, it does not. Recall that the
symbol ‘–e Earth’ is well-formed: it expresses the glaringly false thought
that the Earth is identical with the True. If you delete the horizontal from
this symbol, the remainder no longer expresses any thought whatsoever.
e sense of a singular term, Frege famously said, is “a mode of pre-
sentation (eine Art des Gegebenseins)” of the object it designates (if it des-
ignates anything). Now if what is le of an ideographic sentence when the
judgement-stroke is deleted designates a truth-value just as any (non-empty)
singular term designates an object, then the sense of the truth-value name
is a mode of presentation of a truth-value. So Frege cannot reasonably deny
that all true thoughts can be subsumed under the concept x is a mode of
presentation of the True. So, by the end of the day, a subsumption view is
rehabilitated even by his own lights.
Frege saw to it that truth is a topic whenever a judgment is voiced by
means of an ideographic sentence. But as I said, I think that this does not at
all hold whenever a judgement is voiced in our primary language. And even
when the concept of truth is employed, truth is only very seldom (e.g., when
philosophers meet) what our judgements are about.
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7. Objecthood, Objectivity and Timelessness
According to Frege, truths (and falsehoods) are the intentional objects of
acts of thinking, they are in some sense objective, and they are timeless. In
this section I shall scrutinize these Fregean claims about the status of truth-
value bearers and plead for injecting a dose of Husserl into Frege and for
mitigating his Platonism a bit.
e theoretical use of the word ‘intentional’ by Brentano and his follow-
ers was based upon the colloquial use of the Latin phrase ‘tendere arcum in
aliquid (directing, aiming, one’s bow-and-arrow at)’. Frege takes proposi-
tional acts of thinking to be directed at thoughts:
(F.22) Something in a thinker’s consciousnessmust be aimed at the thought
(auf den Gedanken hinzielen). But this should not be confused
with thought itself. Similarly, [the star] Algol is dierent from
the idea (Vorstellung) someone has of Algol. (Ged, 75a)
Let us call this the act-object model of propositional thinking. (We are not
concerned with thinking of Paris or of one’s lover.at is why I say ‘proposi-
tional thinking’.) In support of the act-objectmodel Frege appeals to certain
linguistic data:
(F.23) It may well be the case that people sometimes understand by the
word ‘thought’ an act of thinking, but this is not always so. . .For
do we not say that the same thought is grasped by this person and
by that person? And that each person has the same thought over
and over again? (N, 147, 149 (136, 137))
To be sure, we do say such things. But then, we also say that two couples
are dancing the same dance or that one couple repeatedly danced the same
dance. Frege emphasizes:
(F.24) To think is to grasp a thought (N, 201 (185), 214 (198)); (Ged, pas-
sim)
But we can hear this slogan in the same way we understand ‘To waltz is to
dance a waltz’. Correspondingly, we can understand ‘What did Ann think
just now? at she would like to go to Vienna.’ aer the pattern of ‘What
did they dance a moment ago? e Strauss waltz Vienna Blood.’ One feels
no temptation whatsoever to say about the relation of this waltz to the many
dancers who dance it what Frege is fond of saying about the relation of one
and the same thought to themany thinkers who think it: that it “stands vis-à-
vis (gegenüberstehen) various people, like a tree”.24 Wecan easily characterize
24 Ged, 66; GG I, xvii; N, 138 (127), 145 (133), 160 (148), 214 (198).
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the structure of propositional thinking without presupposing that thoughts
are its intentional objects:
(A) e thinkers d and d′ think the thought θ i:
For some x, for some y, x is a thinking by d ∧ y is a thinking by d′ ∧
θ is the propositional content of x ∧ θ is the propositional content
of y.
(B) d thinks the thought θ at times t and t′ i:
for some x, for some y, x is a thinking by d at t ∧ y is a thinking
by d at t′ ∧ t ≠ t′ ∧ θ is the propositional content of x ∧ θ is the
propositional content of y.
is act-content model is by no means alien to Frege:
(F.25) By a thought I understandnot the subjective performance of think-
ing but its objective content (objectiver Inhalt), which is capable
of being the common property of many thinkers. (SuB, 32, n.)
e thought that is expressed by ‘Each even number greater than 2 is the sum
of two primes’ is designated by various singular terms, such as its nickname
‘Goldbach’s Conjecture’ and nominalizations of any sentence expressing it.
So thoughts are objects—in the broad Fregean reading of this term under
which everything that is designated by a singular term is an object. (Under
this reading, waltzes are objects, too.) Hence it is false to take Frege’s third
realm, that is, the realm of senses, and the realm of signications (Bedeutun-
gen) to be disjoint, as evenDummett oen does. Goldbach’s Conjecture, like
any other object, does belong to the realm of signications, although it is not
the signication of a sentence. But the fact that thoughts are objects is not
a good reason for claiming that propositional thinking is directed towards
thoughts as its intentional object. Of course, like anything else, a thought can
also become the intentional object, the topic, of an act of thinking. If I judge
that Goldbach’s Conjecture is well-known to mathematicians, one thought,
sc. Goldbach’s Conjecture, is the topic of my thinking and another thought,
sc. the thought that Goldbach’s Conjecture is well-known to mathemati-
cians, is the content of my thinking. And if I judge that (the thought that
each even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes) is well-known
to mathematicians, then one thought is both the intentional object of my
thinking and a proper part of its content but another thought is its complete
content (cf. Künne 2005, 259).
e act-content model ensures that one and the same thought can be
thought repeatedly and bymore than one thinker, but it leaves openwhether
the thought θ might exist even if no propositional thinking (in whatever
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mode) ever occurs. But the act-object model does not guarantee the latter
kind of independence either. My copy of Frege’s GG can be perceived by
many people, and it can be perceived more than once by the same perceiver,
and yet my copy ofGG does not exist in a possible world in which no think-
ing and no writing ever takes place. In this respect thoughts might be more
similar to books than to trees. ey might be what Husserl called bound
idealities (as opposed to free idealities).25 e argument
(1) ere is no thinker x such that the existence of thought T depends
on the existence of x.erefore,
(2) the existence of T does not depend on there being any thinker
is no more valid than the argument
(1*) ere is no log x such that the existence of Ben’s log hut depends
on the existence of x.erefore,
(2*) the existence of Ben’s log hut does not depend on there being any
log.
Without being individuallydependent on the existence of a particular thinker,
each thought could be generically dependent on there being thinkers.26 Let
us stipulate
x is subjective =D f x is a mental act-or-state, or x consists of mental
acts-or-states
x is objective =D f x is not subjective
x is super-objective =D f e existence of x does not depend on there
ever being any mental acts-or-states.
is allows us to classify judgements, beliefs and all other mental acts and
states as subjective and thoughts as objective, just as Frege wants them to
be classied, but it also allows for a distinction in the realm of the objective:
trees andmountains are super-objective, while books and string-quartets are
not. is distinction makes one wonder whether thoughts are really super-
objective, as Frege maintains. is claim might be an overreaction against
those who take thoughts to be subjective, and I think it is.
Frege argues:
25 Husserl (1948, 321).
26 On the relevant notions of dependence see Peter Simons (1987, Ch. 8.3)
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(F.26) In order to be true, thoughts—e.g. laws of nature—not only do
not need to be acknowledged by us [as true]: they do not even
have to be thought by us. . .We conclude from this that these thoughts
. . . are principally independent of our thinking (überhaupt von
unserem Denken unabhängig). (N, 144–145 (133))
I do not think that the personal pronoun matters in this argument. Frege
hardly wants to allow for the possibility that the truth of a law of nature, say,
though not dependent on our, or on human, thinking, may be dependent on
some thinking going on in some corner of the universe. I take Frege’s ‘we’ to
embrace all thinking beings. Furthermore, if the conclusion is to have any
chance of following from the premiss, the premiss cannot allow for the possi-
bility that the truth of a law of nature, say, though not dependent on its being
thought by anyone, is dependent on some thought or other being thought.
e truth-value of the thought that water contains oxygen, for example, only
depends on the chemical composition of water, and the chemical composi-
tion of water does not depend on anyone ever thinking anything. But then,
how convincing is the following Independence Argument?
(Indep)(Pr) e truth of the true thought that water contains oxygen
does not depend on anyone ever thinking this or any other
thought. So,
(C) the existence of the true thought that water contains oxygen
does not depend on anyone ever thinking anything.
Is (Indep) valid? Consider an analogous argument. Let J be an act of judging
that water contains oxygen. Following Bolzano and Husserl, we can call an
act of judging correct (richtig) i its content is true.e correctness of J does
not depend on anyone’s ever thinking anything, but only on the chemical
composition of water. But the analogous conclusion is obviously false: the
existence of J is by nomeans independent of anyone ever thinking anything.
So why should (Indep) justify its conclusion? e conclusion may be true,
but it does not follow from the premiss.
According to Frege, the copula in an utterance of the form ‘e thought
that p is true’ is only grammatically but not logically tensed: it does not carry
a reference to the time of the utterance. If a true thought were always true
then it would a fortiori now be true, but when Frege is careful he always
insists that truth is timeless, atemporal (zeitlos), not omnitemporal. He is
not always careful:
(F.27) [T]he laws of nature, and likewise those of mathematics have al-
ways held good (gelten von jeher) and not just since they were
discovered. (N, 144 (133))
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e verb ‘gelten’ is here just a stylistic variant of ‘wahr sein’. I quote this
remark in spite of its sloppiness concerning timelessness vs. everlastingness,
because Martin Heidegger, unwittingly, contradicted it three decades later:
(H) Newton’s Laws, the Law of Contradiction, any truth whatsoever is
true only as long as there isDasein. . .Before Newton’s laws were dis-
covered they were not true. . .Before him they were neither true nor
false. . .ey became true through Newton. (Sein und Zeit (1927),
§44.c)
According to (H), nothing whatsoever was true before the dawn of human
existence; whatever is true was neither true nor false before it became known
to be true, and it will again become neither true nor false with the dusk of
human existence. (is is an extremely implausible version of alethic anti-
realism: more sober anti-realists tend to say that something is true only if it
can in principle be known to be so.) Frege has refuted (H) long before it was
written:
(F.28) e astronomer can apply a mathematical truth in the investi-
gation of long past events which took place when . . .no-one had
yet recognized that truth. He can do this because the truth of a
thought is timeless. (Ged, 74)
If the laws that are used by astronomers in their explanations were neither
true nor false at the time when the events to be explained occurred, how can
their explanations work? Similarly, if the laws that are used by astronomers
in their prediction of an eclipse of the sun, say, will be neither true nor false at
the time (aer the extinction of Dasein) when the predicted eclipse is sup-
posed to take place, how is it that such predictions have a good chance of
being true?
Now Frege says of true thoughts not only that they are timelessly true, he
also claims that they are timeless (not in time):
(F.29) e thought that we have formulated in the Pythagorean theorem
is timelessly true. (Ged, 69)
(F.30) e thought that we formulate in the Pythagorean theorem is
surely timeless. (Ged, 76)
Do not be misled by the example. What Frege says about the geometrical
theorem he is ready to say about any truth, and he does say it. Does the
timelessness of truth imply that truths, that is, truth-bearers are timeless? To
be sure, if thoughts are not in time then they are not subjective, and Frege
is keen to deny that they are subjective. But if they are timeless they are
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not only objective, they are super-objective. So once gain, this may be an
overreaction on Frege’s part, and I think it is. Or are we obliged to accept
truths being timeless as soon as we have endorsed truth’s being timeless? Is
the following Atemporality Argument valid?
(Atemp)(Pr) e thought θ is timelessly true. So,
(C) the thought θ is timeless.
Consider an analogous argument. Let J be an act of judging, and let us call an
act of judging correct (richtig) i its content is true. Now it is as reasonable to
say of the copula in ‘J is correct’ that it is logically untensed, as it is reasonable
to say this about the copula in ‘θ is true’. But the analogous conclusion is
obviously false. Like any other act, J is certainly not timeless: it takes place at
a certain time. Sowhy should (Atemp) justify its conclusion?e conclusion
may be true, but it does not follow from the premiss. So I grudgingly admit
that in one respect Heidegger may well be right: perhaps there are true (as
well as false) thoughts only in that epoch in the history of the universe in
which there are thinkers around. is does not at all imply that they are
only true in that epoch. If the copula in ‘is true’ is no more logically tensed
than the ‘=’ in an equation, then ‘true at such-and-such a time’ applies to
nothing.
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